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Abstract
This paper investigates the link between the optimal level of non¯nancial
¯rms' leverage and macroeconomic uncertainty. We develop a structural model
of a ¯rm's value maximization problem that predicts that as macroeconomic un-
certainty increases the ¯rm will decrease its optimal level of borrowing. We test
this proposition using a panel of non{¯nancial US ¯rms drawn from the COM-
PUSTAT quarterly database covering the period 1991{2001. The estimates
con¯rm that as macroeconomic uncertainty increases, ¯rms decrease their lev-
els of leverage. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our results are robust with
respect to the inclusion of the index of leading indicators.
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11 Introduction
\WASHINGTON, March 12 (Reuters) | Newell Rubbermaid Inc. (NYSE:NWL
| News), a household and business products maker, on Wednesday ¯led with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (News { Websites) to periodically sell up to
$1 billion in debt securities ... company said the net proceeds of the sale would
be used for general corporate purposes. These could include additions to working
capital, repayment of existing debt and acquisitions, according to the shelf registration
¯ling. Under such a ¯ling, a company may sell securities from time to time in one
or more o®erings, with amounts, prices and terms determined at the time of sale."1
As all these changes in debt a®ect the leverage level, it is important to understand
the driving factors leading to this variation. For this purpose one has to study the
indicators that in°uence the \underwriters" advice with respect to the best timing for
issuing debt. The motivation for this research is further illustrated by the amount of
issued debt taking place nowadays. For example on March 12, 2003 Reuters informed
about twelve more di®erent debt issues, including Moore North America ($400 mln),
Citigroup ($1.5 bln), Bank of America ($295 mln), Shaw Group ($253 mln), Comcast
($1.5 bln), Eli Lilly ($500 mln), Hanson Australia Funding ($600 mln), Unisys Corp
($300 mln).2
The most common purposes for borrowing are capital investment and existing
debt repayment. However, some corporations change the amount of debt they issue
just before the o±cial announcement. For instance, both Citigroup and Comcast
originally planned to sell $1.0 billion notes each. Therefore, we intend to shed some
light on the issue why ¯rms change their decisions about initial o®erings.
The determinants of capital structure have always attracted a lot of attention in
1Citation: Yahoo! Bond Center: Latest Bond Market News, 12 March 2003,
http://biz.yahoo.com/n/z/z0400.html?htime=1047576818
2Ibid.
2the literature. In their seminal work, Modigliani & Miller (1958) derived the the-
oretical result that under the assumption of perfect capital markets, ¯nancial and
real variables are irrelevant for a ¯rm's capital structure. However, recent empirical
research provides contrary evidence. For instance, a vast number of studies show a
positive relationship between liquid asset holdings and ¯rms' investment decisions.3
Other studies show that ¯rm leverage depends on ¯rm{speci¯c characteristics such as
cash holdings, total assets, and the investment{to{capital ratio.4 However, empirical
evidence on the interaction of macroeconomic level variables and capital structure in-
dicators is rather scarce. As an exception, Baum, Caglayan, Ozkan & Talavera (2002)
¯nd a negative relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and cross{sectional
distribution of cash{to{asset ratios for US non{¯nancial ¯rms. Hence, their study
supports the view that macroeconomic uncertainty is an important factor of ¯rms'
decision{making. By furthering this idea, we intend to contribute to the literature on
corporate debt by analyzing the impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on the optimal
level of leverage.5
We formulate a dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model of a representative
¯rm's value optimization problem. The model is based upon a empirically testable
hypothesis regarding the association between optimal level of debt and uncertainty.
The model predicts that an increase in money growth uncertainty or in°ation uncer-
tainty leads to a decrease in leverage. In times of greater macroeconomic uncertainty
companies will issue less debt.
For testing this prediction we utilize an unbalanced panel of non{¯nancial ¯rms'
data obtained from the quarterly COMPUSTAT database over the 1991{2001 period.
After some screening procedures it includes more than 30,000 manufacturing ¯rm{
3See for example Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1998); Fazzari, Hubbard & Petersen (1988).
4See Shuetrim, Lowe & Morling (1993); Auerbach (1985); Weill (2001).
5One \natural" extension would be to examine the e®ect of idiosyncratic ¯rm{speci¯c uncertainty
on leverage. However, such an analysis would be beyond the scope of this paper.
3year observations, with about 700 ¯rms per quarter. We also consider a sample split,
de¯ning categories of durable{goods makers vs. non{durable goods makers. We apply
the Arellano & Bond (1991) dynamic panel data approach.
Our main ¯ndings can be summarized as follows. We ¯nd evidence of a negative
association between the optimal level of debt and macroeconomic uncertainty as prox-
ied by either the conditional variance of money growth or the conditional variance of
industrial production. Moreover, leverage levels of durable{goods makers are more
sensitive to changes in monetary policy than those of non{durable goods makers. The
results turn out to be robust to the inclusion of the index of leading indicators.
These results provide useful insights into corporate capital structure decisions.
Changes in macroeconomic uncertainty, partially in°uenced by monetary policy, will
not only a®ect ¯rms' leverage but also their costs of obtaining external ¯nance, and
in turn their investment dynamics. Moreover, monetary policy will have an e®ect
on the discount rates of investment projects. Therefore, our results suggest that the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy is much more complicated than formu-
lated in standard models which ignore the interaction of real and ¯nancial variables'
¯rst and second moments.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
value maximization model for a representative ¯rm. Section 3 describes the data
and discuss our results. Finally, Section 4 concludes and gives suggestions for further
research.
2 The Q Model of Firm Value Optimization
2.1 Model Setup
The theoretical model proposed in this paper is based on the ¯rm value optimization
problem and represents a generalization of the standard Q models of investment
4by Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1998), Love (2003) and Hubbard & Kashyap (1992).
The present value of the ¯rm is set equal to the expected discounted stream of Dt,











Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It;










5BT = 0;8t (2)
The ¯rm maximizes equation (1) subject to three constraints. The ¯rst is the capital
stock accounting identity Kt+1 = (1¡±)Kt+It; where Kt is the beginning{of{period
capital stock, It is investment expenditures, and ± is the rate of capital depreciation.
The second constraint de¯nes ¯rm dividends, where ¦(Kt;»t) denotes the maximized
value of current pro¯ts taking as giving the beginning{of{period capital stock, and »t
is a pro¯tability shock. C(It;Kt;"t) is the real cost of adjusting It units of capital.
Note that " is a shock that occurs between periods t¡1 and t and it is assumed to be in-
dependent of ¯rm{speci¯c variables. We incorporate ¯nancial frictions assuming that
risk{neutral shareholders require an external premium, ´(Bt;Kt;ºt); which depends
on ¯rm{speci¯c characteristics such as debt and capital stock. Similar to Gilchrist &
Himmelberg (1998), we also assume @´=@Bt > 0: i.e., highly indebted ¯rms have to
pay an additional premium to compensate debt{holders for additional costs because
of monitoring or hazard problems. Moreover, @´=@Kt < 0: i.e., large ¯rms enjoy a
lower risk premium. The gross interest rate is equal to (1 + rt)(1 + ´(Bt;Kt;»t));
where rt is the risk{free rate of return. Finally, Bt denotes ¯nancial liabilities of the
¯rm.
5Financial frictions are also introduced through the non{negativity constraint for
dividends, Dt ¸ 0 and the corresponding Lagrange multiplier ¸t: The ¸t can be
interpreted as the shadow cost of internally generated funds. The last equation (2)
is the transversality condition, which prevents the ¯rm from borrowing an in¯nite
amount and paying it out as dividends.






















Note that £t =
(1+¸t+1)
(1+¸t) . Expression ¯£t may serve as a stochastic time-varying
discount factor which is equal to ¯ in the absence of ¯nancial constraints (¸t+1 = ¸t).
Equation (3) relates the optimal level of debt, Bt+1; with the marginal pro¯t of capital,
@¦(Kt+1;»t+1)=@Kt+1, the marginal adjustment cost of investment, @C(It;Kt)=@It,
the expected marginal adjustment cost in period t+1; @C(It+1;Kt+1)=@It+1, and the
relative shadow cost of external ¯nancing in periods t and t + 1.6











In the steady state ¯(1 + rt+1)£t = ¯(1 + rt+1) = 1; which implies that ´t+1 +
@´t+1
@Bt+1Bt+1 = 0: Since we assume
@´t+1
@Bt+1 > 0; Bt is guaranteed to be positive only
if ´t+1 < 0: Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1998) suggest that the risk premium may be
negative if ´ is considered as net of tax advantages or agency bene¯ts.
6For simplicity, we ignore the derivative of the investment adjustment cost function with respect
to the capital stock, @Ct
@Kt. In our data the mean of It







. Therefore, its e®ect is unimportant.
6Our parametrization approach roughly follows Love (2003) and Gilchrist & Him-
melberg (1998). The level of ¯nancing constraint for a representative ¯rm i, £it, is a
function of their stock of cash and level of debt:









Kit is the cash{to{total assets ratio,
Bit
Kit is the debt level and a0i is a ¯rm{
speci¯c indicator of ¯nancial constraints. Debt generates interest and principal obli-
gations and increases probability of ¯nancial distress, while the availability of liquid
assets decreases the external ¯nance constraint (see also Hubbard, Kashyap & Whited
(1995); Almeida, Campello & Weisbach (2004)). Therefore, the ratio a2
a1 is expected
to be negative, and its value may be either greater or lesser than unity depending on
whether the source of ¯nancial constraints are existing debt or liquidity problems.







The parameter ºi might be interpreted as a ¯rm-speci¯c optimal level of investment.









In order to introduce macroeconomic uncertainty into the model, we parameterize




























It+1; where "t+1 is a macroeconomic shock in-
dependent of
It+1










= ¿t: Then the


























where S is the ¯rm's sales, K is the capital stock, µ =
®k
¹ , ®k is the capital share in
the Cobb{Douglas production function speci¯cation and ¹ is the markup (de¯ned as
1/(1+·¡1), where · is the ¯rm{level price elasticity of demand).
Finally, we linearize the product of ¯t; £t and At; where At =
@¦t+1






¡ (1 + rt+1)
@´t+1
@Kt+1Bt+1: We utilize a ¯rst{order Taylor approximation
around the means. Ignoring constant terms, the approximation is equal to:
¯t£tAt = ¯°£t + ¯At + °¯t (9)
where ¯ is the average discount factor and ° denotes the unconditional mean of
At. We assume rational expectations in order to replace expected with realized values
plus a ¯rm{speci¯c error term, et, assumed to be orthogonal to the information set
available at the time when optimal investment and borrowing are chosen. Our ¯nal
model speci¯cation takes the form8
Bit
TAit
















+ ¯6¿t¡1 + fi + Indi + eit
where the parameters are de¯ned as9
7The discussion in Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1998) suggests that a sales{based measure of the
marginal pro¯t of capital is more desirable comparing to operating income measure.
8The level of the capital stock K is proxied by total assets, TA. Moreover, we scaled debt by total
assets in order to decrease the e®ect of heteroscedasticity, and changed time indices for B=TAt+1,
which is determined at time t.

























< 0; fi is a ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed e®ect which is a func-
tion of a0i and ºi.10 Moreover, we control for industry speci¯c e®ect using industry
dummies Indi.
Since COMPUSTAT gives end{of{period values for ¯rms, we include lagged prox-
ies for uncertainty in the regressions instead of contemporaneous proxies.11 Thus,
we can say that recently{experienced volatility will a®ect ¯rms' behavior. The main
hypothesis of our paper can be stated as:
H0 : ¯6 < 0 (11)
That is, macroeconomic uncertainty a®ects optimal level of leverage and this e®ect
is negative. In other words, when ¯rms anticipate \bad times" then they carry a lower
level of debt. Our model speci¯cation also predicts that ¯3 < 0 and ¯4 < 0. The
optimal level of ¯rm leverage increases in response to a decrease in liquid assets or
sales. Moreover, given the existence of multi{period liabilities, we expect to ¯nd
persistence in the leverage ratio, ¯1 > 0.
2.2 Identifying Macroeconomic Uncertainty
The macroeconomic uncertainty identi¯cation approach resembles that of Baum et al.
(2002). Firms' debt decisions depend on anticipation of future pro¯ts and invest-
ments. The di±culty of evaluating the optimal amount of debt issuing increases with
the level of macroeconomic uncertainty.
10The ¯rm{speci¯c e®ect is equal to fi =
¡
1 ¡ ¯(1 ¡ ±)
¢
®ºi + ¯°a0i.
11In our analysis we also employ the lagged value of the detrended index of leading indicators as
a control variable.
9The literature suggests candidates for macroeconomic uncertainty proxies such as
moving standard deviation (see Ghosal & Loungani (2000)), standard deviation across
12 forecasting terms of the output growth and in°ation rate in the next 12 month (see
Driver & Moreton (1991)). However, as in Driver, Temple & Urga (2002) and Byrne
& Davis (2002) we use a GARCH model for measuring macroeconomic uncertainty.
We argue that this approach is better suited in our case because disagreement among
forecasters may not a valid uncertainty measure and it may contain measurement
errors.
Two proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty are derived: ¯rst, the conditional
variance of money growth, which is a measure in°uenced by monetary policymakers.
As an alternative we employ the conditional variance of the detrended log of industrial
production to capture the uncertainty emerging from the real economy.12 We employ
arithmetic weighted lags of the conditional variances of money growth (WCV MON)
and industrial production (WCV IP), respectively.13 This approach allows us to
capture the combined e®ects of contemporaneous and lagged levels of uncertainty.14
We draw our series for measuring macroeconomic uncertainty from monthly real
monetary base (DRI series FMBASE) and from industrial production (International
Financial Statistics series 64IZF). For each of these cases we build a generalized
ARCH (GARCH(2,1)) model for the series, where the mean equation is an autore-
gression. Details of the estimated model are described in Table 1. We have signi¯cant
ARCH and GARCH coe±cients for both time series. The conditional variances de-
rived from these GARCH models are averaged to the quarterly frequency and then
used.
12We regress log(IPt) on trend and constant. The generated residuals from this equation are used
as the detrended log of industrial production.





14We also employed a single lagged value of conditional variance of industrial production and
money growth and received quantitatively similar results.
103 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Dataset
We work with the COMPUSTAT Quarterly database of U.S. ¯rms. The initial
databases include 173,505 ¯rms' quarterly characteristics over 1991-2001. The ¯rms
are classi¯ed by two{digit Standard Industrial Classi¯cation (SIC). The main advan-
tage of the dataset is that it contains detailed balance sheet information. However,
one potential shortcoming of the data is the signi¯cant over{representation of large
companies.
We also apply a few sample selection criteria to the original sample. First, we
set all negative values for all variables in the sample as missing. Second, we set
observations as missing if the values of ratio variables are lower than 1st percentile
or higher than 99th percentile. We decided to use the screened data to reduce the
potential impact of outliers upon the parameter estimates. After the screening and
including only manufacturing sector ¯rms we obtain on average 700 ¯rms' quarterly
characteristics.
In order to construct ¯rm-speci¯c variables we utilize COMPUSTAT data items
Long-term debt (data9 item) and Total Assets (data6 item) for leverage ratio, Cash
and Short{Term Investments (data1 item), Capital Expenditures (data90 item), Sales
(data12 item) for Cash{to{Asset ratio (Cash=TA), Investment{to-Asset ratio (I=TA)
and Sales{to-Asset ratio (S=TA).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the ¯rm speci¯c variables. The median
long-term debt as a percentage of total assets is 19% compared to the mean of 21%.
We subdivide the data of manufacturing{sector ¯rms (two{digit SIC 20{39) into
producers of durable goods and producers of non{durable goods on the basis of SIC
¯rms' codes. A ¯rm is considered DURABLE if its primary SIC is 24, 25, 32{39.15
15These industries include lumber and wood products, furniture, stone, clay, and glass products,
primary and fabricated metal products, industrial machinery, electronic equipment, transportation
11SIC classi¯cations for NON{DURABLE industries are 20{23 or 26{31.16 As a control
variable, we also use the detrended index of leading indicators (Leadingt). It is
computed from DRI-McGraw Hill Basic Economics series DLEAD. In order to detrend
we regress the index on trend and constant and generated residuals consider as a
detrended index.
3.2 Empirical results
In this section we present the estimation results on the link between the leverage
level of the ¯rm and both ¯rm{speci¯c and macroeconomic variables. Based on the
predictions of the dynamic stochastic partial equilibrium model, we hypothesize that
non-¯nancial ¯rms decrease the level debt as uncertainty increases.
The results of estimating Equation (11) are given in Tables 3, 4 and 5 for all man-
ufacturing ¯rms, durable{goods makers and non{durable goods makers respectively.
Column (1) of Table 3 represents the Arellano{Bond one{step GMM estimator with
weighted conditional variance of industrial production and weighted conditional vari-
ance of money growth as proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty. Column (2) contain
results from the two{step GMM estimator. We include the detrended index of leading
indicators (Leadingt¡1) in order to control for the macroeconomic environment. The
models are estimated using an orthogonal transformation instrumented by all avail-
able moment restrictions starting from (t ¡ 2).17 As instruments we use B=TAt¡2
to B=TAt¡7, CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡7, I=TAt¡2 to I=TAt¡7, and S=TAt¡2 to
S=TAt¡7.
equipment, instruments, and miscellaneous manufacturing industries.
16These industries include food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, paper products, printing and publish-
ing, chemicals, petroleum and coal products, rubber and plastics, and leather products makers.








T ¡ t + 1
¶1=2
where the transformed variable does not depend on its lagged values.
12Columns (3) and (4) include one{step and two{step system GMM results with the
same proxies for macroeconomic uncertainty. In addition to instruments for trans-
formed equations (B=Kt¡2 to B=TAt¡7, CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡7, I=TAt¡2 to
I=TAt¡7, S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡7) we also use instruments for level equations (¢S=TAt¡1
to ¢S=TAt¡2, ¢CASH=TAt¡1 to ¢CASH=TAt¡2, and ¢I=TAt¡1 to ¢I=TAt¡2).
All regressions include a constant and industry dummies. Moreover, two{step results
are estimated using (Windmeijer 2000) ¯nite sample correction.
The Sargan test results for one{step DPD estimates are not successful. How-
ever, Sargan test has an asymptotic chi{squared distribution only in the case of
homoscedastic error terms. In order to correctly interpret the results coming from
the Sargan test, it is imported to understand the reason why the null hypothesis of
correct speci¯cation of the model may be rejected.18 The validity of instruments is
checked using two{step results, and we cannot reject the validity of overidentifying
restrictions.
Our main ¯nding is that there is a negative and signi¯cant relationship between
leverage and macroeconomic uncertainty. The coe±cients for the uncertainty vari-
ables takes values from -0.0305 to -0.0458 for industrial production proxy and from
-0.0632 to -0.0663 for money growth proxy respectively.
The results also suggest signi¯cant positive persistence in leverage ratio (0.8261
{ 0.9283). The coe±cients for Cash=TAt and Sale=TAt ratios are negative and
signi¯cant and correspond to our model predictions. The coe±cients are marginally
signi¯cant for I=TAt+1. However, the coe±cient for I=TAt is perversely signed, but
weakly signi¯cant. Finally, overall \economic health" denoted by the index of leading
indicators positively a®ects the leverage ratio of US non{¯nancial ¯rms.
We receive an interesting contrast in results for durable good makers and non{
durable goods makers reported in Tables 4 and 5. Durable goods makers exhibit
18Arellano & Bond (1991) mention that the Sargan test on the one{step estimation often leads to
rejection the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid.
13negative signi¯cant e®ects for macroeconomic uncertainty proxied by weighted con-
ditional variance of money growth. The coe±cient for durable good makers is larger
in absolute value coe±cients than those estimated for all ¯rms. As these companies
have larger inventories of work in progress and have longer production cycle they
are more sensitive to volatility in monetary policy, including money growth. At the
same time, they are not a®ected by uncertainty from industrial production side, while
non{durable goods makers are mostly a®ected by this type of uncertainty only.
The results for ¯rm{speci¯c variables for durable/non{durable goods{makers fol-
low the pattern of all ¯rms sample. The puzzle of signi¯cance of negative coe±cient
for I=TAt still exists for durable goods{makers but disappears when we use data for
non{durable goods{makers.
In summary, we ¯nd strong support for our hypothesis (11). Firms decrease their
borrowing in more uncertain times. The results di®er for durable good makers and
non{durable manufacturers. When the macroeconomic environment becomes more
uncertain companies become more cautious and borrow less, even when they might
expect to face decreased revenues and potential cash°ow shortages. Note that these
results con¯rm the results regarding the impact of uncertainty on investment reported
in Bloom, Bond & Reenen (2001).
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between leverage of manufacturing ¯rms and
macroeconomic uncertainty using quarterly COMPUSTAT data. Based on the the-
oretical predictions developed using the well-established Q model of investment, we
anticipate that ¯rms decrease their use of debt when macroeconomic uncertainty
increases. In order to empirically test our model we employ dynamic panel data
methodology. The results suggest negative and signi¯cant e®ects of macroeconomic
uncertainty on leverage for US non{¯nancial ¯rms during 1991{2001.
14There are signi¯cant di®erences in results for durable good makers and non{
durable goods manufacturers. The former exhibit a larger sensitivity to macroeco-
nomic uncertainty re°ected by money growth, while the latter reacted more vigorously
to changes in industrial production volatility. Our results are shown to be robust to
inclusion of the index of leading indicators.
From the policy perspective, we suggest that macroeconomic uncertainty has an
e®ect on non¯nancial ¯rms' capital structure which in turn a®ects their dynamics of
investment. Other studies (see Bernanke & Gertler (1989)) have shown that balance
sheet shocks may a®ect the amplitude of investment cycle in a simple neoclassical
model. Moreover, in many countries monetary policy tends to be persistent in the
direction of change of the monetary instrument, with rare reversals (perhaps re°ect-
ing central banks' interest rate smoothing objectives). Therefore, ¯rms' sensitivity to
macroeconomic uncertainty should be taken into account if any more activist mone-
tary actions are contemplated.
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17Appendix A: Construction of leverage, macroeconomic and ¯rm spe-
ci¯c measures
The following variables are used in the quarterly empirical study.
From the COMPUSTAT database:





From International Financial Statistics:
64IZF: Industrial Production monthly
From the DRI{McGraw Hill Basic Economics database:
DLEAD: index of leading indicators
FMBASE: real monetary base





















Note: Models ¯t to detrended log(Industrial production) and to money growth. * signi¯cant at
10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
19Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All ¯rms ¹ ¾2 p25 p50 p75
Bt
TAt 0.2140 0.0258 0.0872 0.1896 0.3083
It
TAt 0.0372 0.0357 0.0131 0.0269 0.0495
Casht
TAt 0.0747 0.0097 0.0117 0.0329 0.0969
St
TAt 0.3064 0.0211 0.2117 0.2832 0.3721
Durable
Bt
TAt 0.2047 0.0252 0.0792 0.1771 0.2969
It
TAt 0.0360 0.0355 0.0126 0.0258 0.0472
Casht
TAt 0.0797 0.0102 0.0136 0.0376 0.1054
St
TAt 0.0205 0.0211 0.2177 0.2881 0.3734
Non{Durable
Bt
TAt 0.2268 0.0264 0.1017 0.2059 0.3215
It
TAt 0.0387 0.0359 0.0139 0.0285 0.0524
Casht
TAt 0.0676 0.0090 0.0098 0.0275 0.0873
St
TAt 0.2995 0.0217 0.2023 0.2763 0.3693
Note: p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while ¾2 and ¹ represent its
variance and mean respectively.
20Table 3: Determinants of Leverage: All Firms
GMM GMM-System
Variable 1{Step 2{step 1{step 2{step
B=TAt¡1 0.8261¤¤¤ 0.8261¤¤¤ 0.9274¤¤¤ 0.9283¤¤¤
[0.0166] [0.0166] [0.0054] [0.0054]
C=TAt -0.0744¤¤¤ -0.0739¤¤¤ -0.0480¤¤¤ -0.0478¤¤¤
[0.0101] [0.0101] [0.0055] [0.0055]
I=TAt -0.0286¤ -0.0283¤ -0.0186 -0.0189
[0.0162] [0.0162] [0.0148] [0.0147]
I=TAt+1 -0.0205 -0.0206 0.00766 0.00718
[0.0138] [0.0136] [0.0138] [0.0138]
S=TAt -0.0864¤¤¤ -0.0865¤¤¤ -0.0418¤¤¤ -0.0411¤¤¤
[0.0089] [0.0089] [0.0039] [0.0040]
CV MONt¡1 -0.0644¤¤¤ -0.0632¤¤¤ -0.0663¤¤¤ -0.0628¤¤¤
[0.0173] [0.0172] [0.0159] [0.0158]
CV IPt¡1 -0.0321¤¤ -0.0305¤¤ -0.0458¤¤¤ -0.0423¤¤¤
[0.0150] [0.0148] [0.0145] [0.0144]
Leadingt¡1 0.0008¤¤¤ 0.0007¤¤¤ 0.0009¤¤¤ 0.0008¤¤¤
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Sargan 0.000 0.384 0.000 0.999
df 875 875 1039 1039
LM(1) -13.48¤¤¤ -12.08¤¤¤ -12.88¤¤¤ -12.43¤¤¤
LM(2) 0.7018 0.6969 0.7139 0.7110
N. Obs 24106 24106 25042 25042
Note: Every equation includes constant and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust
standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM using DPD package for OX.
\Sargan" is a Sargan{Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (p{value reported). \LM (k)" is the
test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments for GMM estimations are B=TAt¡2 to B=TAt¡7,
CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡7, I=TAt¡2 to I=TAt¡7, and S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡7. Instruments for
GMM-SYSTEM estimations are B=Kt¡2 to B=TAt¡7, CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡7, I=TAt¡2 to
I=TAt¡7, S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡7 and ¢S=TAt¡1 to ¢S=TAt¡2, ¢CASH=TAt¡1 to ¢CASH=TAt¡2,
and ¢I=TAt¡1 to ¢I=TAt¡2.* signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
21Table 4: Determinants of Leverage: Durable goods{makers Firms
GMM GMM-System
Variable 1{Step 2{step 1{step 2{step
B=TAt¡1 0.8174¤¤¤ 0.8182¤¤¤ 0.9199¤¤¤ 0.9214¤¤¤
[0.0222] [0.0219] [0.0077] [0.0077]
C=TAt -0.0775¤¤¤ -0.0725¤¤¤ -0.0460¤¤¤ -0.0454¤¤¤
[0.0141] [0.0131] [0.0076] [0.0077]
I=TAt -0.0660¤¤¤ -0.0555¤¤ -0.0506¤¤ -0.0468¤¤
[0.0242] [0.0233] [0.0222] [0.0215]
I=TAt+1 -0.0286 -0.0301¤ 0.00895 0.00703
[0.0191] [0.0180] [0.0196] [0.0194]
S=TAt -0.1047¤¤¤ -0.1021¤¤¤ -0.0481¤¤¤ -0.0474¤¤¤
[0.0126] [0.0123] [0.0053] [0.0053]
CV MONt¡1 -0.0812¤¤¤ -0.0672¤¤¤ -0.0873¤¤¤ -0.0828¤¤¤
[0.0224] [0.0219] [0.0209] [0.0210]
CV IPt¡1 -0.0232 -0.0166 -0.0410¤¤ -0.0402¤¤
[0.0206] [0.0196] [0.0199] [0.0198]
Leadingt¡1 0.0008¤¤ 0.0006 0.0011¤¤¤ 0.0010¤¤¤
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Sargan 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.982
df 443 443 607 607
LM(1) -9.880¤¤¤ -8.926¤¤¤ -9.548¤¤¤ -9.184¤¤¤
LM(2) 0.7790 0.7777 0.7816 0.7758
N. Obs 14176 14176 14731 14731
Note: Every equation includes constant and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust
standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM using DPD package for OX.
\Sargan" is a Sargan{Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (p{value reported). \LM (k) is the
test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments for GMM estimations are B=TAt¡2 to B=TAt¡4,
CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡4, I=TAt¡2 to I=TAt¡4, and S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡4. Instruments for
GMM-SYSTEM estimations are B=Kt¡2 to B=TAt¡4, CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡4, I=TAt¡2 to
I=TAt¡4, S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡4 and ¢S=TAt¡1 to ¢S=TAt¡2, ¢CASH=TAt¡1 to ¢CASH=TAt¡2,
and ¢I=TAt¡1 to ¢I=TAt¡2. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%
22Table 5: Determinants of Leverage: Non durable goods-makers
GMM GMM-System
Variable 1{Step 2{step 1{step 2{step
B=TAt¡1 0.8726¤¤¤ 0.8727¤¤¤ 0.9401¤¤¤ 0.9421¤¤¤
[0.0208] [0.0203] [0.0066] [0.0065]
C=TAt -0.0667¤¤¤ -0.0619¤¤¤ -0.0499¤¤¤ -0.0483¤¤¤
[0.0129] [0.0125] [0.0076] [0.0078]
I=TAt 0.0262 0.0221 0.0247 0.0292¤
[0.0187] [0.0177] [0.0175] [0.0169]
I=TAt+1 0.0061 0.0083 0.0049 0.0038
[0.0193] [0.0195] [0.0184] [0.0180]
S=TAt -0.0624¤¤¤ -0.0622¤¤¤ -0.0329¤¤¤ -0.0322¤¤¤
[0.0112] [0.0115] [0.0057] [0.0057]
CV MONt¡1 -0.0380 -0.0377 -0.0363 -0.0405
[0.0270] [0.0242] [0.0242] [0.0234]
CV IPt¡1 -0.0491¤¤ -0.0489¤¤ -0.0522¤¤ -0.0487¤¤
[0.0211] [0.0196] [0.0207] [0.0201]
Leadingt¡1 0.0006 0.0008¤ 0.0005¤¤ 0.0006¤¤
[0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Sargan 0.000 0.358 0.000 1.000
df 295 295 459 459
LM(1) -10.52¤¤¤ -9.912¤¤¤ -10.37¤¤¤ -10.13¤¤¤
LM(2) 0.04574 0.04491 0.0456 0.0469
N. Obs 9930 9930 10311 10311
Note: Every equation includes constant and industry dummy variables. Asymptotic robust
standard errors are reported in the brackets. Estimation by GMM using DPD package for OX.
\Sargan" is a Sargan{Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions (p{value reported). \LM (k) is the
test for k-th order autocorrelation. Instruments for GMM estimations are B=TAt¡2 to B=TAt¡3,
CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡3, I=TAt¡2 to I=TAt¡3, and S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡3. Instruments for
GMM-SYSTEM estimations are B=Kt¡2 to B=TAt¡3, CASH=TAt¡2 to CASH=TAt¡3, I=TAt¡2 to
I=TAt¡3, S=TAt¡2 to S=TAt¡3 and ¢S=TAt¡1 to ¢S=TAt¡2, ¢CASH=TAt¡1 to ¢CASH=TAt¡2,
and ¢I=TAt¡1 to ¢I=TAt¡2. * signi¯cant at 10%; ** signi¯cant at 5%; *** signi¯cant at 1%.
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